Fredrik Sjöholm opened the discussion by noting that post-crisis economic performance in Indonesia was not disappointing, considering the massive economic collapse triggered by the Thai contagion and the hesitant policy response by the Indonesian government. The economy had been growing at a rate of over 5 percent over the past 5 years, which could be explained in terms of privatesector dynamism unleashed by the signiªcant liberalization reforms during the New Order era. Sjöholm argued that the mixed outcome regarding the decentralization program could be because most of the provinces are too small to be economically viable or are not well integrated in the global economy because of their geography and poor infrastructure. As for the latter point, he suggested that a systematic Indonesia-China comparison of interregional growth performance could yield important policy lessons for Indonesia.
The major focus of the ensuing discussion was on the continued decline in the rate of investment (investment as a percentage of GDP) during the post-crisis period. Keun Lee questioned the validity of the agency-cost explanation of investment contraction in the post-crisis period. In the lead-up to the crisis, high agency cost was often referred to as a major problem of the investment climate in Indonesia, but private investment continued to expand, fuelling the economic boom. Liqing Zhang supported Lee's argument by noting that agency cost is a long-term consideration affecting investment decisions, which is not relevant for explaining investment behavior in the aftermath of a crisis. Zainal Yusof pointed out the need for treating local private investment and FDI separately from government investment for a clear understanding of the causes of the poor investment performance, in particular persistently negative net FDI inºows. He noted that Indonesia's ranking in terms of various indicators provided in the World Bank's Cost of Doing Business Database has gone down in recent years. This was consistent with the available anecdotal evidence of shifting of foreign investors from Indonesia to Vietnam and other low-cost locations in the region. Prema-chandra Athukorala alluded to continuous contraction in real bank credit to the private sector as another possible explanation of the investment slump. Unlike in Malaysia and South Korea, in Indonesia the banking recurring process has not gone far enough to carve out bad debts and resuscitate lending capabilities of the banking system. Indonesia's banking restructuring strategy of issuing recapitalization bonds to crisis-affected banks (rather than carving out bad debts and injecting new liquidity) turned out to be counterproductive; there was no incentive for banks to expand credit to the private sector because these bonds earned handsome interest income. Naoyuki Yoshino pointed out Indonesia's half-hearted approach to corporate restructuring as another possible explanation.
Keun Lee asked why the poverty level in Indonesia declined, not increased, in the immediate post-crisis period. On the same theme, Zainal Yusof wanted to know about the impact of the crisis on regional income disparities. Bhanupong Nidhiprabha questioned the plausibility of the empirical evidence reported in the papers as to the role of inelastic derogate demand as an explanation of Indonesia's historically high inºation by regional standards. He pointed out the possibility that this ªnding might reºect an "omitted variable" problem in the econometric analysis.
In responding to the issues raised in the open discussion, Iwan Azis emphasized that a lack of experienced/qualiªed leaders and administrators is the major obstacle to the smooth functioning of the decentralization program. To make matters worse, there are no incentives for the provincial governments to improve performance because of the "soft budget constraint." On the issue of regional income distribution, Azis noted that according to his estimates of the Williamson index disparities had been deteriorating. Regarding his analysis of the causes of Indonesian inºation, he admitted the difªculties involved in delineating supply and demand factors underpinning inºation given the data limitations and the need for qualifying his inferences. On the continuous decline in the investment rate, Azis agreed that contraction in real bank credit was a major factor. Lack of incentives for aggressive credit expansion on the part of the bank given easy-life assured by recapitalization bonds and lack of demand for credit in an unfavorable investment environment could explain contraction in bank credit.
